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Association as client.

Plaintiff deals only briefly with the

latter two issues in his reply brief, however, a substantial
portion of the reply brief is an attempt to explain away his
conduct.

Accordingly,

this

brief

will

deal

primarily

with

plaintiff's attempt to justify his conduct.
I.
While the facts must be interpreted in the light
most favorable to plaintiff, this does not mean that
unfavorable facts and unfavorable inferences that must
necessarily be drawn from those facts should be disregarded.
Plaintiff

argues

that

the

Homeowners

have

improperly

interpreted the facts, specifically claiming that the Homeowners
have interpreted the facts in their favor when the law requires
that the facts be interpreted in plaintiff's favor.

Plaintiff's

complaint is not so much that the facts have been misinterpreted
as it is that inferences drawn from the undisputed facts are
unfavorable to him.

Indeed, plaintiff does not identify any

specific material facts that he disputes, nor can he.
While

the

plaintiff

is

entitled

to

have

the

facts

interpreted in the light most favorable to him, that rule does
not require that unfavorable facts be disregarded.

Nor does it

require that favorable inferences be drawn from facts where the
only inferences reasonable minds could draw from the facts are
unfavorable to plaintiff.
"reasonable

inferences

Plaintiff is only entitled to those

fairly

to

be

drawn"

from

the facts.

Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62, 63 (1964)
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because public policy requires that an attorney not be permitted
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settlement in his fee agreement and the Homeowners* settlement to
avoid trial was not a breach of the fee agreement.
The
interpretation of a contract is a question of law to be decided
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II.
The undisputed facts demonstrate that
plaintiff acted unreasonably in refusing to
approve the Homeowners' settlement and in the
prosecution of the suit against the Homeowners.
The refusal to approve
the settlement was unreasonable.
With

respect

Homeowners'

to

the plaintiff's

settlement

of

refusal

to approve

the

the Homeowners' claims against

the

developer, there is no dispute that:
1.

The highest offer made by the developers to settle the

Homeowners' claims

prior

payment of $45,000.

R. 1635.

2.

Prior

to the end of the first

to the second

trial was

trial of the Homeowners' claims

against the developers the developers had rejected plaintiff's
proposal

to

settle

the

Homeowners'

claims

upon

payment

$75,000f and counter offered to pay $47f000 to settle.
3.

Plaintiff

recovering

between

estimated

of

R. 1635.

that there was a 75% chance of

$50,000 and

$80,000

at

the second trial.

R. 1634.
4.

The damage evidence introduced by plaintiff at the first

trial on the claims which were to be retried was a maximum of
$92,954.47.
5.

R. 307.

If the case were trie:; or settled after trial began then

plaintiff's share of any recovery would have been 10%.
1636-1637.
-4-

R. 1014,

6.

Ten percent of the $92,954.47 in total damages shown in

the first trial is $9,295.45.
7.

Plaintiff's net fee under the contingency fee agreement

at the settlement accepted by the Homeowners was $15,250.
other

$3f050

of

the

$18f300

contingent

fee

was

to

The

go

to

substitute counsel that had been specially brought in to try the
case while plaintiff vacationed. R. 1006, 1636-1637.
Even giving
inferences

the plaintiff

the benefit of all reasonable

in his favor that may be fairly drawn from these

undisputed facts (and the other undisputed facts set forth in the
Homeowners1

principal brief), the facts compel the conclusion

that the plaintiff acted unreasonably in refusing to approve the
$61,000

settlement.

compensating

the

The

Homeowners

settlement,
for

their

though

losses, was

not

fully

obviously

within the expected range and produced a higher fee than could
have been earned

if the case had proceeded to trial or had

settled anywhere within the range of reasonable expectation on
the eve of trial.
have worked

Any delay in setting the case would actually

against

the plaintiff

because his

share of the

contingent fee would have been reduced and substitute counsel's
would have increased as the trial approached.
1637; see Homeowners' principal brief, pp. 23-29«
foregoing

undisputed

facts, plaintiff's

R. 1014, 1636In view of the

conclusory

assertions

that the recovery at the second trial would have been in excess
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of $100,000 and that the case could have been settled for more
than $90,000 on the eve of trial are too speculative to support
any inference that such a recovery or settlement could have been
had, particularly in the absence of specific supporting facts.
Plaintiff's bald assertion
achieved is not enough.

that such results could have been

Provenzino v. Merchants Forwarding, 363

F. Supp. 168, 175 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
Whether

the

contingent

fee based

on

the settlement

was

comparable to an hourly fee is not relevant to the reasonableness
of plaintiff's conduct.

Plaintiff knew that the contingent fee

arrangement involved a gamble and that he might not recover a fee
sufficient to compensate him for the time he and his staff had
into the case at an hourly rate.

R. 1006.

The settlement was

reasonable beyond douDt, both from the standpoint of the total
recovery and the net attorney's fee to plaintiff.

And even if

the settlement had not produced the highest possible net fee, the
plaintiff still could not complain because an attorney should not
be able to force a client to reject a reasonable settlement offer
merely because he hopes to increase his fee by doing so.
Plaintiff's attempt to assert a claim
of fraudulent inducement was unreasonable.
The undisputed

facts

relating

to plaintiff's attempt

to

attack the trial court's summary judgment in Homeowners' favor
based on the claim that he was fraudulently induced to enter the
fee agreement further shows the unreasonableness of plaintiff's
-6-

conduct,

particularly

the

unreasonable

approach

plaintiff with respect to this litigation.2
1.

taken

by

Those facts are:

Plaintiff claims to have discovered the alleged fraud in

September 1980, just prior to the first trial of the Homeowners'
claims against the developers,
2.

Between

the

time

R. 1583-1584, 1589-1590.

the

alleged

fraud

was

supposedly

discovered in September 1980 and the time plaintiff filed his
memorandum alleging fraud with the trial court in September 1986,
plaintiff

never

told

the

Homeowners

that

he

felt

misrepresentations had been made to him or that he claimed to
have been defrauded by them.
3.

Plaintiff

R. 1522-1527, 1584-1585, 1589-1590.

never mentioned

any claim of fraud in his

October 1980 letter to the Homeowners reporting on the results of
the

first

developers.
4.

trial

of

the

Homeowners1

claims

against

the

R. 1589-1590.

Plaintiff never raised any claim of fraud when he filed

his original complaint against the Homeowners in September 1983
or in any of the seven amended complaints he later proposed.
R. 2, 264, 539, 533, 708, 834, 911, 1184.

^Notwithstanding plaintiff's claim to the contrary, the
Homeowners have denied the plaintiff's allegations of fraud.
R. 1560.
No counter-affidavit was made below in response to
plaintiff's motion based on the fraud because the object of the
Homeowners' opposition was to have the motion dismissed as a
matter of law based on undisputed facts. A counter-affidavit
would only have created an issue of fact.

-7-

5.
delay

Plaintiff has never offered any reason for the six year

in claiming

he was defrauded.

(The affidavit

of Mr.

Woodward attached as Exhibit 1 to plaintiff's reply brief does
not

offer

any

justification

for

the

delay,

in

spite

of

plaintiff's suggestion that it does.)
The inferences to be drawn from these undisputed facts are
inescapable.

Since plaintiff

offers

no

explanation

for

the

delay, the only inferences that reasonable minds can make from
these facts are either that there never was any fraud or that the
alleged misrepresentations were not considered to be material by
the plaintiff.

The inference most favorable to plaintiff is that

he never considered the alleged misrepresentations material.

In

either case plaintiff should never have asserted the fraud claim,
and the claim could not have been asserted for any legitimate
purpose.
Furthermore, the fraud claim should never have been asserted
because it is obviously barred by the statute of limitations.
Plaintiff's
applicable

claim

the

statute

because he is using

disingenuous.
seek

that

of

limitations

the alleged

fraud

is

not

defense is

Plaintiff seeks to use the allegations of fraud to

affirmative

relief

in

the

form

of an

increase

recovery from the defendant Homeowners1 Association.

in his

This is not

a defensive use of fraud like that referred to in the cases cited
by plaintiff.

Fraud is used defensively only when it defeats a

-8-

claim for affirmative relief asserted by a plaintiff against the
defendant raising fraud as a defense,

Mid-State Homesf Inc. v.

Johnston, 547 P.2d 1302, 1306 (Okla. 1976).
The pleadings and joinder
of parties shows unreasonableness.
Similarly, the facts concerning the number of pleadings in
this case and the number of parties and the circumstance of their
joinder are not disputed.
speak

for

themselves.^

The pleadings are in the record and
The

inferences

J

drawn

from

the way

As stated in the Homeowners1 reply brief, not all of the
pleadings in this case relate to the plaintiff's claim for
attorneys1 fees. The Homeowners never disclosed the claims to
which the other pleadings related because they had agreed at
plaintiff's request to keep the terms of the settlement
confidential.
Since plaintiff has breached the agreement,
disclosed the settlement and claimed the malpractice claim was
asserted in bad faith, the claims to which the pleadings relate
can now be disclosed. The bases for the Homeowners1 malpractice
claims and the good faith with which they were asserted are shown
in the Homeowners' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Judgment and the affidavit submitted in support found
in the record at pages 333 through 369. However, it is worth
noting that one of the claims of malpractice was based on
plaintiff's admitted dismissal, with prejudice, of one of the
Homeowners' claims without first consulting with or obtaining
authority for such dismissal from, any of the Homeowners. The
settlement of the malpractice claim is further evidence of the
Homeowners' desire to avoid the stress and expense of
litigation. Moreover, there is nothing in the record on appeal
to support plaintiff's claim that the Homeowners' malpractice
action was motivated by a desire to harass plaintiff or to get
revenge. Nor do the pages of John Webster's deposition cited by
plaintiff support such a claim. Mr. Webster's deposition shows
that the Homeowners were reluctant to file a malpractice action
or raise the issue of malpractice because they did not want to be
involved in any more liltigation. (Webster deposition, pp. 166170.)
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plaintiff has pursued this case must be made in the context of
all of the undisputed facts.

The number of pleadings and joinder

of numerous additional defendants might, taken alone and with all
inferences

drawn

zealousness

in

plaintiff's

favor,

on plaintiff's part.

But

be

excused

as

over-

in the context of the

plaintiff's other conductf no reasonable person (even one drawing
all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor) could conclude
that plaintiff prosecuted

the suit as he did merely out of a

desire to recover an attorney's fee due him.

Particularly since

plaintiff's original notice of appeal included an appeal from the
dismissal of the claims against

the other parties though the

funds necessary to pay plaintiff's claims were then being held by
court order.

R. 1850-1852.

The nature of the Homeowners
is relevant to the unreasonableness
of plaintiff's conduct.
A description of the nature of the Homeowners is necessary
to place the plaintiff's conduct in proper perspective.

Again,

it is undisputed that the Homeowners were suffering considerable
stress as a result of the litigation with the developers and that
they were very concerned about the expense of litigation.
is shown by plaintiff's own letters.

This

R. 1005-1007, 1011-1012.

Nor is there any dispute regarding the fact that the Homeowners
are olderf retired people.

R. 1637.

Plaintiff does, indirectly,

dispute the claim that the Homeowners are on fixed incomes by
-10-

offering

his

testimony

that

three of

the admittedly

retired

people had retired from good jobs and had considerable wealth.
R. 1667, 1668.

Even if plaintiff's claims were accurate, and

even if they are interpreted in plaintiff's favor, reasonable and
fair interpretation will not permit one to infer that all (or
many) of the Homeowners are similarly situated.
of

factual

support

in

the

record

rebutting

In the absence
the Homeowners'

testimony (by the president of the Homeowners' Association) that
many

of

the

Homeowners

are

on

fixed

incomes

(R. 1637), no

inference can be drawn from the facts offered by plaintiff to
rebut the Homeowners' testimony.
Thus, interpreting the facts most favorably to plaintiff,
the only conclusion that can be reached is that the plaintiff
acted unreasonably both in his refusal to approve the settlement
and in his prosecution of this action.

As a result of that

conduct he should not be permitted to recover interest on the
attorney's fee awarded by the trial court.
III.
The Homeowners' tender of payment and the
lack of an agreement regarding fees precludes
the recovery of interest on the fee.
The Homeowners' tender of the amount due is relevant for
purposes of their cross-appeal because it was the plaintiff's
wrongful refusal to accept the payment of the appropriate fee
that resulted in the delay in the payment of the fee.
-11-

Plaintiff

was never entitled to more than the amount tendered and should
not

be

permitted

to

recover

interest

unwarranted refusal to accept payment.
the entire amount of
award.

interest

as

a

result

of

his

The Homeowners have paid

included

in the trial court's

No amount is due plaintiff for which interest has not

been paid and for which a refund should not be made to the
Homeowners.
While an attorney may be entitled to interest on a fee once
reduced to final judgment even in the absence of an agreement to
pay interestf the fee is nothing more than an account receivable
until that time.

The interest involved here is for the period

before the fee claimed was reduced to final judgment.

Under the

authorities cited in the Homeowners1 original brief, since there
was no agreement to pay interest heref plaintiff is not entitled
to recover any interest on his attorney's fee.
Conclusion
The reasonableness of a party's conduct may be a question of
fact for the trier-of-fact in some contexts.

But where, as here,

the facts relating to the conduct are undisputed and those facts
and the inferences that must necessarily be drawn from those
facts

show

beyond

any

doubt

unreasonably, the reasonableness

that

the

party

has

acted

(or unreasonableness) of the

party's conduct may be determined as a matter of law.

The only

justification offered by plaintiff for his refusal to approve the
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settlement desired by the Homeowners is his factually unsupported
claim that the recovery at trial would have been in excess of
$100,000 and that the case could have been settled for $90,000.
The

specious

nature

of

these

claims

is highlighted

by

the

undisputed facts showing that the damage evidence at the first
trial showed a maximum damage claim of under $93,000 and that the
developers had already rejected plaintiff's $75,000 settlement
offer.

Because of the unusual fee arrangement plaintiff had with

substitute counsel, who would actually try the case, it was to
plaintiff's advantage to settle the case at the amount desired by
the Homeowners.

The undisputed facts require reasonable minds to

conclude, without exception, that plaintiff acted unreasonably.
He

should

not

be

permitted

to

recover

interest

since

he

unreasonably refused to accept the appropriate fee and there was
no

agreement

providing

for

the

payment

of

interest

on

attorney's fee.
DATED this 21st day of February, 1989.
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER

L.R. GARDINER, JR.
THOMAS R. VUKSINICK
Attorneys for Respondents and
Cross-appellants
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